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Abstract 
Using a sample of fare quotes for non-stop travel from New York to London, 
this paper investigates the dynamics of offered fares as the departure date 
nears.  We find that the general trend is toward fare increase at an accelerated 
rate as the departure date approaches.  Clear differences in price-setting 
strategies among the carriers competing on a particular route are documented. 
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1 Introduction 
While a substantial amount of research has been devoted to analyzing the airline industry, 
relatively few facts are known about airline fares at the micro level. Morrison and 
Winston (1990) find that fares on any given market depend on the degree of competition 
and deregulation.  It is also suggested that there is substantial dispersion of fares in the 
industry, the degree of which positively depends on competition (Borenstein and Rose, 
1994; Stavins, 2001).  The literature examining airport dominance initially suggested 
(Borenstein, 1989; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Berry, Carnal and Spiller, 1996) that 
within the US market airlines charge higher fares for trips to/from the airports where they 
have a dominant position.  More recent evidence (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005) suggests 
that this apparent ‘hub premium’ can be explained by the passenger mix on these routes.  
It is common knowledge that the closer the departure date, the higher the fares become.  
Travel agents usually advise the public to take trips in the middle of the week because 
then prices seem to be lower.  Yet, the dynamics of changes in fares as the departure date 
nears has not been studied.  Nor is it clear how much less one can expect to pay if one 
chooses to travel during the middle of the week as opposed to embarking on a trip 
towards the end of the week.   
Also, the above facts mostly tell us about the inter-market comparison of prices 
and/or average fares.  The airport dominance literature suggests that there may be intra-
market differences in the ways airlines set their fares.  Indeed, Bilotkach (2006) detected 
that last-minute offered fares on the London-New York market were more dispersed 
across the airlines as compared to the advance-purchase ones.  This paper, taking 
advantage of modern technology allowing easy collection of offered fares on the internet, 
both studies the dynamics of offered fares in the airline industry, as well as tests for 
potential differences in observed prices across airlines on a given route.  We thus 
contribute to filling two important gaps in the literature on airline pricing. 
 We use the sample of offered fares (a total of over 70,000 fare quotes) on the 
London–New York route, collected in the autumn of 2005.  We have a number of 
competitors on this market, which allows us to observe not only the general trend in fares 
as one moves closer to the departure date but also whether the dynamics of fare-setting is 
similar or different across the airlines.  We find the following (in addition to the well-
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known fact that tickets for travel mid-week are cheaper and that the price increases as the 
departure date nears).  First, the rate of increase in offered fares accelerates as the 
departure date nears.  Second, there are substantial observable across-airline differences 
in the dynamics of price changes. 
 Our paper provides the first evidence of differences across the airlines’ price-
setting strategies in a given market.  The question of the reasons behind those 
dissimilarities is left open.  Yet, it may be important to take the possibility of carriers 
employing different strategies into account in the future modeling efforts and data 
analysis exercises related to the airline industry. 
 The rest of the paper is organized in a straightforward way.  Section 2 describes 
the data, Section 3 discusses results of the data analysis, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Data 
To address the question of whether or not individual airlines’ price-setting strategies are 
different, we obviously need a market with a good number of competitors to allow for 
relevant comparisons.  We have selected the New York-London route, since on this 
market we have seven carriers offering non-stop service.  Those airlines are: American 
Airlines (AA), United Airlines (UA), Continental Airlines (CO), British Airways (BA), 
Virgin Atlantic (VS), Air India (AI), and Kuwait Airways (KU).  In addition to those, 
MaxJet and Eos offer business-class only services between New York’s JFK and 
London’s Stansted airports.  The market itself is one of the biggest international routes 
(second biggest after Taipei-Hong Kong market) and is comparable in size to the biggest 
US domestic markets1.  The airlines’ market shares are rather asymmetric, as evident 
from the following table, borrowed from Bilotkach (2007).  This will allow us to examine 
not only whether the price-setting strategies are different across airlines, but also if there 
is any correlation between a particular airline’s market share and an observed strategy.  In 
addition to the above-mentioned advantages of using the New York-London route, we 
must note that one-stop competition on this market is hardly feasible (unlike, for instance, 
on transcontinental routes within the United States), since any connecting service 
                                                 
1 The number of seats offered on London-New York route (see Bilotkach, 2007) is only about 15% less 
than those of the biggest US market (Chicago-New York), and is about the same as on the second-biggest 
route in the US (Houston-Dallas)  
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between New York and London will entail substantial increase in travel time (except for 
maybe service via Dublin or Shannon in Ireland).  
 
Table 1  Market Shares on New York – London Market 
Share of Seats Offered Share of Passengers Carried Airline 
July 1999 July 2004 July 1999 July 2004 
British Airways 33.7% 34.9% 32.4% 34.1% 
Virgin Atlantic 18.0% 24.0% 18.4% 24.6% 
American Airlines 17.0% 18.9% 17.5% 19.0% 
Continental Airlines 6.8% 8.0% 7.1% 8.4% 
United Airlines 11.6% 6.4% 12.0% 6.5% 
Air India 5.6% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7% 
Kuwait Airways 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 
Source: Bilotkach (2007).  Only schedules services have been used in calculations 
 
For the purpose of data collection, we use expedia.com – a leading on-line travel 
company directly linked to several major global distribution systems.  This ensures that 
fare quotes obtained on-line will be similar to those one would get through an ‘off-line’ 
travel agent.  We collected the data for 60 days, from September 22 until November 21, 
2005.  The fare quotes were obtained daily, for one-way travel between a New York City 
area airport (JFK or Newark Liberty, joint airport code NYC) and a London area 
endpoint (either Heathrow or Gatwick, joint code LON).  We sought fare quotes for 
travel on each of the next 60 days and for the first full week of each of the 4 months 
following the initial 60-day period.  For example, on November 1, 2005 we collected the 
fare quotes for the next 60 days up to January 1, 2006, as well as the quotes for travel 
during each day of the first full week of January, February, March and April.  Only 
economy class fare quotes were collected, and we recorded fare quotes for all non-stop 
flight options offered by expedia.com.  This allows us to see if there are any differences 
in offered fares between the morning, afternoon, and evening departures, other things 
equal. 
 One surprising result of our data collection exercise is the discrepancy between 
the airlines’ market shares and the shares of quotes in our sample, as evident from Table 
2.  This happens due to absence of fare quotes for a number of airlines (most notably 
British Airways and American Airlines) for dates closer to the departure.  The most likely 
explanation of this fact is that some airlines fill up their economy class cabin more 
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quickly than the others, either due to the differences in price-setting policies, or because 
their economy class cabins occupy a smaller share of the aircraft.  Moreover, airlines’ 
overbooking strategies can be different: while some carriers may stop posting price offers 
once a cabin is full, others may continue offering high fares, resulting in overbooked 
flights.  Also, the market shares may not be perfectly correlated with the number of fare 
quotes observed since different airlines may offer different frequency of service, while 
carrying the same number of passengers, by using aircraft of different size. 
 
Table 2  Breakdown of Sample by Airlines 
Airline Number of Fare Quotes 
Share of Fare 
Quotes, % Mean of Fare Quotes 
Standard Deviation 
of Fare Quotes 
Air India 9 568 13.03     517.52      303.64 
American Airlines 8 693 11.84     779.97       76.12 
British Airways 10 990 14.96     770.35       10.86 
Continental 10 365 14.11     775.58       79.47 
Kuwait Airways 1 985 2.70     753.45      116.59 
United Airlines 4 741 6.46     784.61      228.21 
Virgin Atlantic 27 102 36.90     445.90      261.06 
Total 73 444 100.00     620.03     259.02 
 
The average one-way fare in our sample (including all applicable taxes and fees) is 
$620.03, with the standard deviation of $259.02.  Of all fare quotes, about 17% are for 
flights departing in the morning (before noon).  An average inquiry yields 14.31 fare 
quotes, or two quotes per airline, with the standard deviation of 2.79. 
 If we compare our average offered fare to the same as collected by Bilotkach 
(2006) for the same market, our data will imply a round-trip fare which is about $150 
lower.  Yet, Bilotkach’s data contain a larger share of last-minute fares as compared to 
our sample. 
 Let us look at the snapshot of the raw data.  Figure 1 presents the fare quotes of 
six different airlines (excluding Kuwait Airways), as collected on November 5, 2005.  It 
is obvious that there are discrepancies in the ways the airlines decide on one-way offered 
fares.  For example, while BA and CO offer the same (and almost identical) fares no 
matter how far in advance you would like to purchase, VS and AI vary their fares to a 
large extent.  It is not, however, clear whether the latter two airlines’ strategies are similar 
or different.  Also note that the figure below represents a snapshot at one of the sixty days 
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of data collection.  While some discrepancies are suspected, it is not clear how systematic 
they are.  Yet, Table 2 suggests that the picture we observe in Figure 1 is an accurate 
representation of the entire sample.  Virgin Atlantic and Air India are seen offering one-
way fares which are lower than those offered by other carriers on the market; also, the 
distribution of fares offered by British Airways and Continental Airlines appears the least 
dispersed. 
 
Figure 1  Snapshot of Raw Data, Collected on November 5, 2005 
 
 
 
3 Results 
We subjected our data to relatively simple regression analysis.  The quoted fare will be 
the independent variable in all regressions.  The following dependent variables are used. 
First, we include the interval (in days) between the date of obtaining the fare quote and 
the flight departure date, as well as that interval squared.  Second, we use airline 
dummies, and interaction of those with interval and interval squared (Air India is the 
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baseline category here).  Third, dummies for the day of the week on which flight is 
scheduled are included (Monday is the baseline).  Finally, other controls are the indicator 
variable for morning departures, purchase weekday2, and the number of fare quotes 
collected at the same query as the present fare quote (which can be construed as a 
measure of competition).  We also suspected seasonal differences due to major holidays 
falling within the range of our data collection; yet, including indicator variables for 
Thanksgiving week and winter holidays (November 21-27, 2005 and December 19, 2005 
through January 7, 2006) did not change the results in any fundamental way. 
 Table 3 below presents the main regression results.  Three specifications are 
reported, with different combinations of control and airline-specific variables.  Table 4 
reports results of F-tests for equality of coefficients on airline dummies, as well as those 
on airline dummy-interval and airline dummy-interval squared interactions; the third 
specification reported in Table 3 is used as the unrestricted model for the relevant tests. 
 
                                                 
2 The day of the week on which the fare quote was obtained. 
 7
Table 3  Regression Results 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) Regressor (1) (2) (3) 
Interval              -1.0650*** (0.0806) 
-0.8724*** 
(0.2311) 
-0.8720*** 
(0.2311) 
Interval * 
Continental  
-0.5212*** 
(0.0591) 
0.4468* 
(0.2492) 
0.4461* 
(0.2492) 
Interval2               0.0078*** (0.0003) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0013) 
Interval * 
Kuwait 
Airways  
-0.6007*** 
(0.0803) 
0.0962 
(0.4028) 
0.0962 
(0.4026) 
Morning           2.5744 (1.8923) 
4.7334** 
(1.8808) 
4.6824** 
(1.8804) 
Interval * 
United 
Airlines  
-0.7066*** 
(0.0812) 
0.0399 
(0.3833) 
0.0420 
(0.3834) 
Fare Quotes -6.5818*** (0.4161) 
-6.5538*** 
(0.4158) 
-6.7052*** 
(0.4177) 
Interval * 
Virgin 
Atlantic 
1.2787*** 
(0.0629) 
-0.6333** 
(0.2597) 
-0.6348** 
(0.2597) 
American 
Airlines                
298.0943*** 
(5.3243) 
285.0934*** 
(8.1013) 
285.0233*** 
(8.1002) 
Purchase: 
Tuesday             
-3.3718 
(2.7144) 
British Airways   274.5962*** (5.0457) 
244.8598*** 
(7.4269) 
244.8505*** 
(7.4273) 
Purchase: 
Wednesday        
-1.8136 
(2.8228) 
Continental          287.9561*** (5.2906) 
263.7706*** 
(8.1674) 
263.7494*** 
(8.1663) 
Purchase: 
Thursday           
1.5297 
(2.8115) 
Kuwait Airways   280.0563*** (7.8623) 
262.2774*** 
(14.6774) 
262.2778*** 
(14.6665) 
Purchase: 
Friday               
1.9270 
(2.8343) 
United Airlines    309.5654*** (8.4330) 
290.9074*** 
(14.1164) 
290.8016*** 
(14.1199) 
Purchase: 
Saturday    
-10.2606*** 
(2.9016) 
Virgin Atlantic     -127.186*** (5.4796) 
-84.0164*** 
(8.1769) 
-83.9325*** 
(8.1762) 
Purchase:  
Sunday   
-1.8154 
(2.7444) 
Departure: 
Tuesday               
-20.0384*** 
(3.2406) 
-19.9258*** 
(3.2328) 
-19.8415*** 
(3.2327) 
Interval2* 
American 
Airlines            
 -0.0030** (0.0014) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0014) 
Departure: 
Wednesday  
-19.1992*** 
(3.2962) 
-18.8211*** 
(3.2919) 
-18.8665*** 
(3.2933) 
Interval2* 
British 
Airways           
 -0.0075*** (0.0013) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0013) 
Departure: 
Thursday  
-25.1144*** 
(3.1595) 
-25.5660*** 
(3.1492) 
-25.4334*** 
(3.1480) 
Interval2* 
Continental   
-0.0057*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.0014) 
Departure: 
Friday  
-9.4105*** 
(3.3031) 
-9.5210*** 
(3.2912) 
-9.4811*** 
(3.2899) 
Interval2* 
Kuwait 
Airways           
 -0.0040* (0.0021) 
-0.0040* 
(0.0021) 
Departure: 
Saturday  
0.3948 
(3.3173) 
0.0495 
(3.3062) 
0.0506 
(3.3048) 
Interval2* 
United 
Airlines            
 -0.0043** (0.0020) 
-0.0043** 
(0.0020) 
Departure:  
Sunday           
-8.3617** 
(3.6507) 
-7.9833** 
(3.6467) 
-8.1415** 
(3.6460) 
Interval2* 
Virgin 
Atlantic 
 0.0123*** (0.0015) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0015) 
Interval * 
American 
Airlines  
-0.6028*** 
(0.0592) 
-0.0866 
(0.2452) 
-0.0869 
(0.2452) Constant 
639.6830*** 
(9.5469) 
634.7646*** 
(11.0119) 
638.9186*** 
(11.3928) 
Interval * 
British Airways  
-0.3742*** 
(0.0576) 
0.8511*** 
(0.2318) 
0.8500*** 
(0.2318) 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.40 0.41 0.41 
Notes: Robust (?) Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  Price is the dependent variable in all 
regressions. The omitted weekday is Monday. The omitted airline is Air India.  
*** Significant at 1%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
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Table 4  Pair-wise Comparisons of Airline-Specific Variables 
 
Panel A: Airline Dummies 
 American British Airways Continental Kuwait Airways United Airlines 
British Airways 0.0000     
Continental 0.0000 0.0000    
Kuwait Airways 0.0831 0.1716 0.9112   
United Airlines 0.6432 0.0001 0.0307 0.1009  
Virgin Atlantic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Airline Dummy – Interval Interactions 
 American British Airways Continental Kuwait Airways United Airlines 
British Airways 0.0000     
Continental 0.0000 0.0000    
Kuwait Airways 0.5898 0.0224 0.3070   
United Airlines 0.6846 0.0084 0.2074 0.9041  
Virgin Atlantic 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0371 0.0392 
 
Panel C: Airline Dummy – Interval Squared Interactions 
 American British Airways Continental Kuwait Airways United Airlines 
British Airways 0.0000     
Continental 0.0000 0.0002    
Kuwait Airways 0.5439 0.0334 0.3262   
United Airlines 0.3949 0.0384 0.3987 0.8856  
Virgin Atlantic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: F-test is used for relevant comparisons.  The unrestricted model is specification (3) from Table 3.  
The reported numbers are p-values. 
 
Table 3 shows the existence of both the general trend in the dynamics of offered fares, 
and the airline-specific effects.  If one looks at the coefficients at the interval and 
interval-squared variables, it is easy to see that the general trend implied by our sample is 
for  offered fares to hit the minimum approximately 66 days before the flight3 and 
increasing afterwards at an increasing rate.  Offered fares for travel on Monday and 
Saturday appear higher as compared to other days (with Tuesday to Thursday departures 
showing the lowest fares on average).  On the other hand, one is more likely to get a 
better deal searching for flights during the weekend.  This is understandable, as we can 
expect most of the travel arrangements (especially by travel agents and corporate travel 
departments) to be done during the week.  Fares offered for morning flights appear higher 
too, while the total number of fare quotes (other things equal) is associated with the lower 
                                                 
3 If we take regression 3 from Table 3, the general trend can be described as 
, a polynomial reaching the minimum at 
approximately Interval=66 . 
2*0066.0*872.092.638)( IntervalIntervalIntervalFare +−=
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quoted fare (which is tantamount to the “more competition means lower price” 
conclusion). 
 Table 4 shows that there are both similarities and differences in observed 
dynamics of the setting of one-way offered fares across the airlines.  Virgin Atlantic is 
the only carrier whose coefficients are different from those of the other airlines at least at 
5% significance level (regression results suggest that VS coefficients are significantly 
different from AI’s, too).  On the other hand, United Airlines’ dynamics of price setting 
appears very similar to that observed for American Airlines, Kuwait Airways, and (to a 
lesser degree) Continental Airlines.  British Airways’ and Continental Airlines’ observed 
strategies, however similar they make look at the first glance (see Figure 1), appear 
totally different once examined more carefully.   
Thus, in addition to confirming some of the well-known facts about the dynamics 
of the price-setting in the industry (i.e. fares are higher closer to the departure date), we 
can more closely trace the trend of increases in the offered fares (we determined that the 
general trend is for fares to increase at an increasing rate, as the departure date nears).  
Also, we have observed rather significant differences in both levels and the dynamics of 
price-setting across the airlines operating within the same market.  Further, there is no 
apparent link between the carrier’s market share and its price-setting strategy.  The three 
major players on the market, American, British, and Virgin Atlantic, appear to employ 
different strategies; yet, some of the price-setting dynamics we observed for the major 
players look similar to that of the ‘fringe’ firms (e.g. American Airlines and Kuwait 
Airways). 
 
4 Concluding Comments 
This paper provides new evidence on price-setting strategies employed by the airline 
companies.  By examining a large sample of fares offered by the airlines operating in the 
London-New York market, we are able to observe that the apparent general trend is for 
offered fares (after hitting the minimum about two months before the scheduled departure 
date) to increase at an accelerated rate.  Also, there are differences in observed dynamics 
of price-setting across the airlines.  Furthermore, we are unable to deduce any correlation 
between the observed across-carrier similarities and differences and the airlines’ market 
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shares.  It in interesting to note that Bilotkach (2006), while studying dispersion of the 
offered fares on the same market, determined that the offered fares for last-minute travel 
were higher for the airlines with lower market share. 
 The conclusion that airlines appear to employ different price-setting strategies is 
very interesting since it sheds light on the interaction between the carriers on a day-to-day 
basis.  If we try linking our results to the theoretical models of strategic interaction 
between the airline companies, we can say that the carriers’ best-response functions 
appear to be different.  Answering the question of which model of strategic interaction 
our results are consistent with is beyond the scope of this paper; yet, the existence of 
strategic differences across the airlines studied is an important consideration for future 
research endeavours. 
 The easiest ways to criticize our analysis would be by pointing out that we only 
examine one market and that only one-way offered fares are included.  Here we should 
say that, first of all, the market we selected both has many competitors and the price 
dynamics we observe here is very unlikely to be influenced by actions of one-stop 
competitors, due to sheer lack thereof.  Second, an exercise in gathering fares for return 
trips would be a much more tedious endeavour, due to the huge number of such fares 
offered for any given departure date, depending primarily on the duration of the trip.  We 
would need to necessarily select a sub-set of the return trips, and such a selection would 
necessarily be arbitrary.  It is also possible that the airlines could employ more similar 
strategies in setting the fares for the return trips than those we observed in our sample of 
offered one-way fares.  We leave this question to future research. 
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